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Editorial 
Smarter, Not Harder 
Those familiar wi th the cartoon Dilbert (see http://www.unitedmedia.com/ 
comics/dilbert/index.html) w i l l remember that one of the favorite sayings of 
the pointy-haired boss is " W o r k smarter, not harder." This irritating cliché also 
seems to be a guiding principle adopted by many of the bodies that control 
education. One result of fol lowing such a principle is that to minimize salary 
costs i n education class sizes are allowed to increase. Although some studies 
suggest that smaller class sizes are particularly important for students in the 
lower grades (Biddle & Berliner, 2002; Finn, 2002; Hampel , 2002; Scottish Par-
liament, 2002), the findings are less certain concerning the advantages of 
smaller class size at higher grades (Johnson, 2002). Nevertheless, whether one 
believes that smaller class sizes are beneficial or not, the fact remains that the 
logistics of instructing larger numbers of students are problematic. This is not a 
new phenomenon, nor is it a function of whether teachers are " g o o d " or not. 
Through the study of ancient history, and especially through Hol lywood 
epics, most people have some knowledge of ancient Rome. Al though the 
Republic, and more frequently the Empire, were often portrayed as militaristic, 
wi th individuals prepared to sacrifice their lives at any time, education was an 
underpinning factor that helped support Rome in its imperialistic aspirations. 
M u c h of Rome's military success occurred because of the successful education 
of its soldiers. Most recruits were organized into centuries of 100 under the 
command and tutelage of a centurion. Even during the late Roman Republic, 
opt imum class size was a consideration. A m o n g the various skills that recruits 
had to learn was proper use of the sword and shield. Poor technique would 
leave one exposed to a possibly fatal blow from an enemy soldier. Although 
recruits were shown proper techniques by the centurion, incorrect techniques 
were often practiced by recruits, either through incomplete learning or through 
not paying attention to what they were doing. While the centurion circulated 
among the practicing recruits and corrected inappropriate technique whenever 
it was observed, in many instances, because of the numbers, recruits would 
repeatedly practice incorrect techniques before being corrected. Often the 
result was that i n battle, when stress levels were particularly high, the swords-
manship employed by the new soldiers would revert to the inappropriate 
maneuvers practiced most frequently. The consequence of this was often dis-
astrous, both to the individual soldier and to the particular army. 
By the final years of the Republic the problem of heavy losses of new 
soldiers was of such concern that the matter was investigated and solutions 
sought. One of the first suggestions made was to reduce the size of centuries. 
Thus instead of one centurion, two individuals might be used, each responsible 
for 50 recruits. A s the number of recruits to supervise w o u l d be fewer, it 
followed that the amount of supervised time received by each individual 
w o u l d increase, thus also reducing the amount of time that incorrect tech-
niques w o u l d be practiced. Perhaps not surprisingly, this kind of suggestion 
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was not received favorably by government, because reducing century size 
w o u l d be an expensive proposition (Vegetius). Then, as now, the government 
made the tacit recommendation "Work smarter, not harder." Without altering 
century size, what could be done? 
About this time, either an individual or several individuals thought of using 
technology to improve the teaching of military recruits. The result was the 
creation of the quintain. Al though details differed between individual ex-
amples, the basic design was consistent. A pole stuck vertically in the ground 
supported a horizontal pole placed on top of it. The horizontal pole, which was 
pinned to the top of the vertical pole, was designed to pivot freely. Attached to 
one end of the horizontal pole was a large burlap sack filled with straw, while 
the other end supported a counterbalance weight, sometimes with spikes at-
tached (Kuret, 1963). The basic operation of the quintain was simple. A recruit 
w o u l d practice sword technique against the burlap bag using a blunt practice 
sword. If the technique used was correct, the sack remained relatively station-
ary. However, if an incorrect technique was used, the sack would pivot away 
from the recruit, and the counterweight would swing around, most often 
striking the recruit. This was a clear indication that what was being done was 
wrong. In most instances the recruit would modify his behavior immediately, 
thus practicing proper technique most often. In a century, therefore, a cen-
turion could employ several quintains to help recruits practice proper sword 
techniques. In this manner the centurion was working smarter rather than 
harder. 
A Consul , Publius Rutilius, recognized the method as being superior to 
previous practice, and he advocated universal adoption of the quintain 
(Valerius Maximus) . Al though some Romans saw the utility and advantage of 
using the quintain, others d id not. Some feared that this device would disrupt 
military training and cause the collapse of a traditional system. Others feared 
that the quintain might lead to an increased century size, or at the least to a 
reduction in the number of centurions. Yet another view was that instruction 
from a quintain was inferior to that provided by a live person, and as a result 
the quality of instruction w o u l d be diminished (Valerius Maximus). 
Al though experimental research designs were unknown at the time, com-
parisons between soldiers educated with the quintain and those that were not 
d i d occur. Frontinus, describing a general's experience i n choosing an army, 
noted, 
Gaius Marius had the opportunity to select his army out of two already in 
existence, the army which had served under Rutilius, and the other one which 
had been under Metellus ... He chose the army of Rutilius even though it was 
smaller, because he thought it to be better trained. (Strategemata, 4.2.2) 
It appears that the quintain gained favor extensively, as it eventually be-
came a standard adjunct to direct instruction in Roman armies. The use of the 
quintain continued into the medieval period when the arrival of guns rendered 
the quintain and sword warfare largely superfluous (Buck, 1989). The quintain 




Although m o d e m education bears little resemblance to Roman military 
education, there is a possible parallel wi th how problems of class size are dealt 
with . Instead of either continuing with the status quo or arguing for reduced 
century size only, an adjunct to instruction was used. The quintain was not 
touted as a replacement for the centurion, and it was not regarded as being the 
primary means of instruction. Instead, the quintain was viewed largely as a 
means of assisting both recruits and centurions. Can the experience of the 
Romans using the quintain as an adjunct to instruction be applied to the issue 
of class size in contemporary schools? N o doubt some w o u l d say "absolutely 
not." Indeed the point is not to advocate that teachers use quintains. There are 
nevertheless many appropriate adjuncts to instruction ranging from computer-
based programs to various methods of instructional delivery and assistance. 
The point is that governments are unlikely to change their position sig-
nificantly regarding class sizes at the higher grades. If this is the case, then 
instead of continually trying to change a tradition that seems to have existed 
since Roman times, is it not wise for educators to work smarter? 
George H. Buck 
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